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Chemical Aftermath 
Contamination and Cleanup Following  
the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami
Writers Winifred A. Bird and Elizabeth Grossman 
followed the unfolding Tokohu disaster from their 
respective offices in Nagano, Japan, and Portland, 
Oregon. To form a picture of the damage and begin 
to understand how chemical contaminants and their 
potential health hazards are being handled after 
the tsunami, Bird visited the hard-hit prefectures 
of Ibaraki, Iwate, and Miyagi, while Grossman 
researched company and chemical information and 
how such issues are handled in the United States.
T
hirty days after the most powerful 
earthquake  and  tsunami  in  Japan’s 
recorded  history  struck  the  northeastern 
coast of that country’s main island, the city of 
Ishinomaki was a scene of devastation. The 
busy manufacturing and industrial port town 
in Miyagi Prefecture,
1 close to the epicenter 
of the quake, had suffered some of the worst 
damage of any community in the Tohoku 
region. Pulverized houses, skeletons of factories, 
and mountains of debris lined the dusty streets. 
Crumpled cars were tossed across graveyards, 
broken shipping containers strewn across 
fields. Ruptured oil tanks leaked glossy black 
liquid, bags of agrochemicals sat in iridescent 
puddles, and the doors to a shed labeled
A man makes his way through the devastated town of Kesennuma, Miyagi Prefecture, March 2011. 
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Enlarged Area
1–24: Plastic products, petroleum 
and coal products, transportation 
equipment, ferrous and nonferrous 
metals, ceramics, stone and 
clay products, paper and pulp 
processing, industrial waste 
disposal, vehicle maintenance; 
metal plating; ship building and 
repair; harbor transport; landfill
Chemicals: Acetonitrile, acrylo­
nitrile, acrylic acid, acrylic amide, 
antimony and its compounds, 
asbestos, benzene, bisphenol 
A epoxy resin, boron and its 
compounds, n­butyl methacrylate, 
chloroform, chromium and 
trivalent chromium compounds, 
cobalt compounds, water­soluble 
copper salts (excluding complex 
salt), cyclohexylamine, dioxins, 
ethylbenzene, ethylene glycol, 
ethylenediaminetetraacetic 
acid, formaldehyde, hydrazine, 
hydrogen fluoride and its 
water­soluble salts, lead and its 
compounds, manganese and its 
compounds, methacrylic acid, 
methyl methacrylate, molybdenum 
and its compounds, monomethyl 
ether, nickel and its compounds, 
nonylphenol, phenols, toluene, 
1,3,5­trimethylbenzene, xylene, 
water­soluble compounds of zinc
25–26: Ship building and repair, 
national oil reserve bases
Chemicals: Benzene, bisphenol 
A epoxy resin, chromium and 
trivalent chromium compounds, 
hexavalent chromium, 
ethylbenzene, lead, manganese, 
molybdenum and its compounds, 
nickel and its compounds, 
nonylphenol, toluene, xylene
27–28: Chemicals, glue
Chemicals: Boron and its 
compounds, formaldehyde, 
manganese and its compounds
29–33: Machinery, styrene, metal 
products, plastic products
Chemicals: Nickel compounds, 
styrene, water­soluble 
compounds of zinc
34: Ship building and repair
Chemical: Styrene
35–37:  Food manufacturing, 
incineration plant, petroleum 
and coal products
Chemicals: Chloro  difluoro­
methane, dioxins, ethyl  benzene, 
ethylene glycol, toluene, 
1,3,5­trimethylbenzene, xylene
38: Electronics
Chemicals: Chromium and 
trivalent chromium compounds, 
nickel and its compounds, silver 
and its water­soluble compounds
39–53: Car maintenance, 
chemicals, paper products, 
electronics, plastic products, 
timber and wood products, 
ceramics, stone and clay products, 
steel, industrial waste disposal 
and recycling, military base, 
ship building and repair, fuel 
wholesale and distribution
Chemicals: benzene, bisphenol 
A epoxy resins, boron and its 
compounds, bromomethane, 
water­soluble copper salts 
(excluding complex salt), 
cyclohexylamine, dioxins, 
ethylbenzene, ethylene, ethylene 
glycol, ethylene glycol ethyl 
ether, formaldehyde, hydrogen 
fluoride and its water­soluble 
compounds, lead and its 
compounds, manganese and its 
compounds, nickel compounds, 
di­n­octyl phthalate, toluene, 
1,3,5­trimethylbenzene, xylene
54: Onagawa nuclear power plant 
Chemicals: Asbestos, 
dichloropenta  fluoropropane
55–91: Chemicals, ceramics, 
stone and clay products, ferrous 
and nonferrous metals, metal 
products, plastic products, rubber 
products, electronics, paper and 
pulp processing, petroleum and 
coal products, transportation 
equipment, coatings, power 
generation, railyards, industrial 
waste disposal, industrial laundry, 
oil refineries, printing, metal 
plating, mechanical, equipment, 
and vehicle repairs, petroleum 
products wholesale and distribution
Chemicals: Asbestos, benzene, 
bis(2­ethylhexyl) phthalate, 
bisphenol A epoxy resins, boron 
and its compounds, butyl benzyl 
phthalate, di­n­butyl phthalate, 
chlorodifluoromethane, chromium 
and trivalent chromium, cobalt 
and its compounds, water­soluble 
copper salt (excluding complex 
salt), dichloromethane, dioxins, 
ethene, ethylbenzene, ethylene 
glycol, hydrazine, hydrogen 
fluoride and its water­soluble 
salts, lead and its compounds, 
manganese and its compounds, 
molybdenum and its compounds, 
piperazine, polyoxyethylene 
alkyl ethers, silver and its 
water­soluble compounds, 
tetrachloroethylene, toluene, 
1,3,5­trimethylbenzene, xylene
92–107: Precision machinery, 
asbestos products, metal 
products, timber and wood 
products, ceramics, stone and clay 
products, chemicals, tires and 
rubber products, paper and pulp 
processing, electronics, industrial 
waste disposal, printing, fuel sales
Chemicals: Acrylic acid, 
acrylonitrile, adipic acid, 
asbestos, bis(2­ethylhexyl) 
phthalate, chloroform, hexavalent 
chromium compounds, 
cobalt and its compounds, 
cresol, inorganic cyanides, 
dichloromethane, N­(N,N­
dimethylamino) ethyl acrylamide, 
N,N­dimethylformamide, 
dioxins, epichlorohydrin, 
ethylbenzene, maleic anhydride, 
methyl methacrylate, 
p­octylphenol, styrene, 
1,3,5,7­tetraazatricyclo(3.3.1.1 
(3.7)decane, organic tin 
compounds, toluene, xylene
108: Rubber 
Chemical: Toluene
109–130: Transportation 
equipment, ferrous and 
nonferrous metals, chemicals, 
rubber, electronics, paper and 
pulp processing, livestock 
hygiene service center, 
thermal power generation
Chemicals: Acetonitrile, aniline, 
o­anisidine, bis(2­ethylhexyl) 
phthalate, bisphenol A epoxy 
resins, cadmium and its 
compounds, carbon disulfide, 
o­chloroaniline, chromium and 
trivalent chromium, hexavalent 
chromium compounds, 
cobalt and its compounds, 
cyclohexylamine, 1,2­
dichloroethane, dichloromethane, 
N,N­dimethylformamide, dioxins, 
diphenylamine, ethylbenzene, 
ethylene glycol, formaldehyde, 
hydrazine, hydrogen fluoride 
and its water­soluble 
compounds, lead and its 
compounds, methylbenzene, 
molybdenum and its compounds, 
nickel, p­phenetidine, 
o­phenylenediamine, phthalic 
anhydride, polyoxyethylene alkyl 
ethers, styrene, toluene, o­ and 
p­toluidine, trichloroethylene, 
1,3,5­trimethylbenzene, xylene, 
water­soluble compounds of zinc
Potential for 
Contamination
An Emerging Picture
In the weeks after the March 11 disaster, Toxic 
Watch Network compared PRTR data against 
flood maps to derive a preliminary list of reporting 
facilities that were likely inundated by the 
tsunami.22 This map shows the 130 such facilities 
identified by Toxic Watch Network in the upper 
Tohoku region. It does not include all potentially 
affected facilities—for instance, those in the lower 
Tohoku region or those in the Kashima industrial 
complex, located in the neighboring Kanto region. 
Under PRTR regulations companies must report 
how much of 462 priority hazardous chemicals 
they release or transfer each year. However, the 
PRTR applies only to companies with more than 
20 workers; smaller companies are not required 
to submit data even if they handle large amounts 
of reportable chemicals. Companies also are not 
required to report chemicals that are stored but 
not released or transferred. 
The list below indicates the types of industries 
housed at the mapped facilities as well as 
chemicals reported to have been released 
or transferred in 2008 (the most recent data 
available). This does not necessarily mean these 
chemicals were released during the Tohoku 
disaster. But it does sketch a rough outline of the 
potential for contamination in this area. 
Facilities are grouped geographically.Focus  | Chemical Aftermath
“Chemical Storehouse” flapped open, revealing 
an emptied room. Townspeople and officials 
walked through this huge field of wreckage, 
picking at the remains of their homes or 
simply gazing over the surreal landscape as if 
immobilized by the scale of damage.
2 
The magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsu-
nami of 11 March 2011 inundated 561 square 
kilometers of coastline, reaching up to 5 kilo-
meters inland.
3 The disaster wrought havoc 
from Aomori Prefecture in the north to Chiba 
Prefecture in the south (about 35 kilo  meters 
east of Tokyo); aftershocks affected areas far 
beyond the coast. The earthquake and tsu-
nami  combined  may  have  killed  nearly 
23,600 people
4 and severely damaged or 
destroyed more than 187,000 homes.
5,6
Damage to the region’s industrial facilities 
also has been extensive. Oil refineries burst 
into flames in the days after the disaster, send-
ing black smoke billowing into the air. Sewer 
and gas lines burst, and old electrical equip-
ment containing polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) was washed away.
7 Petro- and agro-
chemical plants, iron foundries, steel works, 
and automotive, electronics, food processing, 
paper, plastics, and pharmaceutical plants were 
among those that suffered damage.
As cleanup continues in the disaster area, 
questions remain about the fate of chemical 
contaminants released by these damaged indus-
trial facilities and other sources, and the environ-
mental health hazards they might pose to the 
hundreds of thousands of people living and 
working in this area. Similar questions have aris-
en in the wake of hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
2005, the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster in the 
Gulf of Mexico in 2010, and the World Trade 
Center attacks on 11 September 2001. But in 
Japan, the vast human catastrophe and deepen-
ing Fukushima nuclear disaster have tended to 
eclipse these issues of chemical contamination. 
The Industries Affected
The tsunami wiped out a strip of coast 
supporting a wide range of land uses and 
industries. The Iwate coast has many fishing 
communities along with cement and plywood 
manufacturers and a large iron foundry in the 
badly damaged city of Kamaishi.
8 The Miyagi 
coastline had an estimated 1,000 factories, 
including a 145,000-barrel-per-day-capacity
9 
oil refinery in Sendai, marine products pro-
cessing plants all along the coast, and various 
manufacturing industries near the ports.
10 
Rice  farms  in  the  Sendai  area—which, 
according to one estimate, support approxi-
mately 8% of Japan’s rice production
11—have 
also been affected. The Fukushima coast has 
fishery-related industries, along with auto 
parts factories and some chemical plants.
12 
Further  south,  in  the  neighboring 
Kanto region, the Kashima industrial com-
plex in Ibaraki Prefecture also suffered major 
earthquake and tsunami damage (although for 
the most part buildings remained intact).
13 The 
Kashima coastal industrial zone is, accord-
ing to Japanese accounts, home to the largest 
number of petrochemical industrial complexes 
in Japan.
14 Other facilities here are a Mitsubishi 
Gas Chemical plant whose products include 
hydrogen peroxide and polycarbonates; an 
Adeka Company plant that produces chlor-
inated inorganic chemicals, flame retardants, 
caustic soda, and other chemicals along with oil-
based food products; and a Mitsubishi Chemical 
plant that is Japan’s largest ethylene production 
site. Facilities reporting damage include the 
Shin-Etsu Chemical Plant, a polyvinyl chlo-
ride (PVC) factory (Shin-Etsu’s optical fiber 
plant in Fukushima was also damaged); Sumi-
tomo Metal, where the earthquake toppled 
equipment and triggered gas tank fires; and 
an Asahi Glass plant that manufactures caus-
tic soda, propylene oxide, fluorocarbon resin, 
and other chemicals, along with various types 
of flat glass used in building construction. 
Dozens of high-tech and automotive 
production facilities also sustained dam-
age from the quake and tsunami. Compa-
nies with plants located in Tohoku include 
Canon, Elpida, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Honda, Kyo-
cera, Nissan, Panasonic, Texas Instruments 
(which described “substantial damage” to its 
semiconductor plant in Miho that affected 
gas, air, and chemical delivery systems), and 
Sony.
15 Reports posted on company websites 
or noted in industry publications summarized 
damage very generally and primarily in terms 
of impact to business and production capac-
ity. One exception is the bulletin from Free-
scale on its semiconductor plant in Sendai, 
which suffered serious damage. The company 
reported that when “personnel first reentered 
the fab [in late March] . . . they found broken 
ducts, pipes and windows and discovered that 
chemicals had leaked.”
16 Online industry pub-
lication Medicine Hot News reported damage at 
seven major pharmaceutical companies in the 
Tohoku region.
17
At the time of this writing, none of the 
affected major manufacturing companies 
had publicly reported in English the specific 
nature of any chemical releases related to the 
earthquake and tsunami. None contacted had 
information to share beyond what was avail-
able by way of website bulletins and similar 
reports compiled by industry sector publi-
cations. Disaster reports from the Japanese 
Ministry of the Environment,
18 Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry,
19 and Fire 
and Disaster Management Agency
20 briefly 
described only a handful of spills including 
hydrochloric acid, chromium, and several 
unspecified hazardous materials, and dam-
age to an ammonia tank; petrochemical spills 
were reported more extensively and in more 
detail. Here again, information beyond that 
in published reports was not available when 
requested by phone.
But data available through Japan’s Pollut-
ant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR),
21 
comparable to the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory, 
indicate numerous chemicals with potential 
environmental and health hazards may have 
been present at many facilities in heavily 
impacted locations. In the weeks follow-
ing the Tohoku disaster, Toxic Watch Net-
work, a Tokyo-based nonprofit organization, 
combed the PRTR data to get a general idea 
of the chemicals that may have been onsite at 
affected facilities. The resulting list includes 
acrylamide, asbestos, benzene, bisphenol A, 
bromomethane (methyl bromide), cadmium, 
chromium compounds, chloroform, chloro-
difluoromethane, ethylene glycol, dioxins, 
formaldehyde, lead, mercury, toluene, and 
xylene (see map, p. A292).
22 Many of these 
compounds are respiratory hazards, neuro-
toxicants, and/or carcinogens. Many are 
potentially acutely toxic. Some are also envi-
ronmentally persistent, which raises potential 
issues of long-term contamination, particu-
larly to local soil and water.
The numerous gas and oil fires that fol-
lowed the earthquake would also have released 
hazardous pollutants, both chemical and par-
ticulate. In addition, debris that may have 
included plastics, wires, vinyl products, and 
insulation has been burned in large, open-air 
piles in the town of Minamisanrikucho, Miyagi 
Prefecture,
23 and possibly at other locations. 
Such fires have great potential to emit addi-
tional hazardous contaminants such as dioxins. 
These known human carcinogens result from 
incomplete burning of PVC, which is used 
extensively in wiring, construction materials, 
and numerous other consumer, industrial, and 
infrastructure applications. Dioxins can also be 
produced by burning seawater-soaked wood.
24
The tsunami caused extensive damage 
to agricultural land and facilities in Aomori, 
Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Chiba 
prefectures,
25 where hogs and dairy and beef 
cattle are raised alongside crops that include 
rice and a variety of vegetables. Although the 
tsunami hit before the start of the main grow-
ing season, pesticides may have been stock-
piled in agricultural locations impacted by 
flooding (according to the U.K.-based Agri-
cultural Information Services consultancy, 
Japan is the world’s second-largest crop pesti-
cide market after the United States, with 60% 
of those pesticides applied to rice 
26). Fertilizer 
and feed additives could also pose potential 
contamination hazards to soil and surface 
and groundwater, and to people encountering 
tsunami sludge and debris. Details are not 
available about specific fertilizers, pesticides, 
and other agricultural chemicals used at farm 
sites affected by the tsunami.
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For a city like Ishinomaki, where paper, fer-
tilizer, feed, and chemical factories are located 
directly adjacent to the shore, near homes and 
schools, the giant wall of water destroyed con-
ventional boundaries between “safe” and “haz-
ardous.” No one knows if oil and chemicals 
spilled in one place stayed put, washed out to 
sea, or ended up in another part of town.
The tsunami may also have carried tsu-
nami sludge from the bottom of bays up onto 
the land. “Ships come in and out of harbors, 
and they leak oil. There’s trash and other 
materials [on harbor floors],” said environ-
mental engineer Toshiaki Yoshioka, who is 
a member of the Japan Society of Material 
Cycles and Waste Management (JSMCWM) 
Disaster Waste Management and Reconstruc-
tion Task Team, an academic association that 
has been surveying disaster waste through-
out Tohoku and helping local governments 
develop plans to manage it. Yoshioka said the 
tsunami sludge could also include heavy met-
als, PCBs, and other pollutants washed down 
rivers by mines and factories before strict anti-
dumping laws were passed in the late 1960s 
and 1970s.
27
The problem of toxics on the harbor floors 
highlights the hazards that modern industrial 
society adds to the age-old destructive force 
of natural disasters. “In the past, what came 
up with the tsunami from the ocean was not 
hazardous,” Yoshioka said. “Now we are using 
all sorts of materials, and everything has been 
mixed together [by the tsunami]. If you just 
burn or bury [tsunami and earthquake waste] 
the risk to the environment is very high. We 
need to process the waste properly, or it will 
come back to haunt us.”
Assessing the Damage
Government
28 and independent
29 estimates 
put disaster waste in the tsunami inundation 
area at about 25 million metric tons, and its 
makeup varies hugely across the disaster 
area. Masato Yamada, chief of the Research 
Center for Material Cycles and Waste Man-
agement at Japan’s National Institute for 
Environmental Studies (NIES), the research 
arm of the Ministry of the Environment, 
pointed out that treating all the waste as 
hazardous would not only be extremely 
expensive and time-consuming, but also 
would rule out the possibility of recycling 
some materials during the reconstruction. 
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A pile of debris burns in the open in Minamisanrikucho, Miyagi Prefecture, 14 April 2011.T
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Yet it’s not yet clear which areas need to be 
treated with particular care. 
“I think the tsunami sludge is proba-
bly not that dangerous except for in a few 
‘hot spots’—the problem is finding them,” 
Yamada said. “We need to know what was 
in the area before the tsunami and earth-
quake hit. Were there industrial chemicals or 
agrochemicals in a certain place? That could 
become a hot spot.”
To an extent, that information does exist. 
Japan’s PRTR regulations require companies 
to report to local governments the quantity of 
462 designated hazardous chemicals that they 
release into the environment or transfer to a 
different location each year.
30 This informa-
tion is compiled by the central government 
and publicly available.
31 
But the PRTR law applies only to compa-
nies with more than 20 workers that handle 
certain chemicals over a specified amount; 
smaller companies aren’t required to submit 
data even if they handle large amounts of toxic 
chemicals.
30 Companies are also not required 
to report on chemicals that are stored but not 
released, an information gap Kyoto University 
disaster planning expert Nagahisa Hirayama 
calls “a very big problem.” Although some of 
that missing information is supplied to local 
and central government offices under Japan’s 
Fire Services Act,
32 which aims to prevent 
fires and limit damage from disasters includ-
ing earthquakes, it is not made public in the 
same way that PRTR data are, according to 
Yoshiaki Matsuki of the Japanese Fire and 
Disaster Management Agency.
PRTR data—and often local disaster 
response plans in the United States—also 
miss entire categories of potential contami-
nants: fuels such as propane and gasoline 
used at factories and in vehicles; materials 
that are bound up in equipment and struc-
tures, including asbestos, wiring components, 
nonasbestos insulation, carpeting, and other 
flooring materials that can pose health haz-
ards when burned; pesticides and other agro-
chemicals kept on farms; and chemicals kept 
in small quantities at homes, shops, and other 
nonindustrial locations. According to Toxic 
Watch Network director Shigeharu Nakaji, 
information about PRTR-listed chemicals 
released during the disaster will be reported 
to the government by June 2011 and made 
public early in 2012. That reporting, however, 
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A volunteer from Tokyo cleans up a home in Higashimatsushima, Miyagi Prefecture, seven weeks after the disaster. T
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Bags of fertilizer lie strewn about the grounds of a factory in Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture, 10 April 2011.
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will not have informed any needed protective 
measures during the first weeks of cleanup.
Even existing data appeared to have 
barely been touched by overwhelmed scien-
tists and government officials two months 
after the disaster. In May local officials in 
Ishinomaki and Kamaishi said they had not 
begun detailed investigations of damage to 
industrial areas or resulting chemical con-
tamination because they were still focused on 
urgent relief and recovery work.
33 By June the 
JSMCWM Disaster Management and Recon-
struction Task Team was finalizing a strategy 
for identifying toxic tsunami sludge hot spots, 
according to Misuzu Asari, an associate pro-
fessor at Kyoto Univer  sity’s Environmental 
Preservation Research Center and a member 
of the task team’s sediment group. The group, 
which was commissioned by the Ministry of 
the Environment to do the work, planned 
to combine PRTR data with onsite soil and 
water tests, she said. But the situation was 
complicated by the fact that much debris had 
already been moved to collection sites. “Now 
we have two jobs: first, we have to identify the 
toxic areas, and second, we have to figure out 
where the debris from those areas was taken,” 
Asari said.  
Testing for common contaminants is 
possible even without information about the 
original location of hazardous materials, and 
such monitoring is a growing focus in the 
Japanese disaster response. But environmental 
contaminant monitoring and testing will find 
only what the tests and instruments have been 
calibrated to seek. The siting of environmental 
testing in relation to potential contamination 
sources can also influence results and thus 
lead to very different decisions about resident 
and community health and safety, according 
to Scott Frickel, a Washington State Univer-
sity associate professor of sociology who stud-
ied contamination after Hurricane Katrina.
34 
This is an issue that has come up in the after-
math of both natural disasters like Hurri-
cane Katrina and industrial accidents like the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster.
In Japan the ongoing recovery and related 
testing—which is proceeding at varying paces 
in different regions—falls roughly into three 
phases. Early on, when many disaster victims 
and emergency response workers are spending 
time surrounded by dusty debris, the tsu-
nami sludge, air, and smoke from open-air 
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Tsunami sludge blocks the doors of a shop in Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture, 10 April 2011.
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waste burning are logical places to begin test-
ing. (However, NIES’s Yamada pointed out 
that because disease-causing pathogens in 
the tsunami sludge are a big concern at this 
stage, thorough testing must be balanced with 
speedy cleanup.) As recovery proceeds and 
debris is moved from temporary to permanent 
storage locations, testing is needed to ensure 
contaminated materials are not recycled or 
improperly disposed of. Later, as residents 
begin rebuilding the worst-hit areas, re  digging 
buried wells, fishing along the coast, and 
planting crops, testing for soil, surface water, 
and groundwater contamination will become 
increasingly important.
Routine monitoring of water, soil, and 
air quality is mainly the responsibility of 
prefectural governments in Japan. However, 
although officials in Fukushima, Miyagi, and 
Iwate prefectures said they were continuing 
routine tests wherever possible, as of the end 
of April they had not begun any testing spe-
cifically related to the disaster.
35 “It’s a matter 
of priority,” said environmental policy expert 
Yoshinobu Kitamura, who is serving on a 
prefectural disaster waste committee in Iwate. 
“The first priority [for prefectural officials] 
is to clean stuff up and keep transport routes 
open. Sure, the government expects contami-
nation, but attention to chemicals is a low 
priority right now.” Harried prefectural and 
municipal officials echoed that explanation.
That situation had begun to change 
by  June.  A  supplemental  disaster  bud-
get approved May 2 for the Ministry of the 
Environment included ¥400 million (about 
US$5 million) for environmental monitoring 
aimed at assessing contamination from asbes-
tos and hazardous materials leaked from fac-
tories and other sources.
36 Led by the central 
government in consultation with local and 
prefectural officials, the first round of tests 
on soil, air, groundwater, public water areas 
(a legal category that includes rivers, lakes, 
ports, water lines, and other public water 
resources), and seawater and the seafloor were 
scheduled to wrap up by late June with results 
to be publicly released by early July.
37 
The Ministry had already carried out 
preliminary asbestos monitoring at 15 loca-
tions in three prefectures by mid-April; results 
fell within legally allowed limits.
38,39 In June, 
asbestos testing began at approximately 
130 locations including temporary houses T
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An oil refinery burns in Ichihara, Chiba Prefecture, March 2011.
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and shelters, building demolition sites, and 
areas still covered in debris in Aomori, Iwate, 
Miyagi, Fukushima, and Chiba.
37
But Naoki Ikeda, an Osaka lawyer with 
experience prosecuting soil contamination 
and worker health cases, warned that con-
tinued public pressure will be needed to 
ensure proper testing continues throughout 
the cleanup. Although strict environmental 
impact assessments are required for major 
public projects like dams, ports, and the con-
struction of large garbage dumps, the same 
does not hold for disaster cleanup itself. “One 
defect of Japanese law is that even though the 
collection of debris is a kind of large-scale 
project, it’s done individually by many towns 
and cities. It’s seen as part of their routine 
responsibility even in this emergency situa-
tion,” Ikeda says. “If we lawyers and citizens 
don’t say anything, they may just collect the 
waste as usual.”
One exception to the general lack of envi-
ronmental monitoring early on was in Sendai, 
Miyagi’s largest city, which has legal respon-
sibilities similar to a prefecture. In April the 
municipal government tested tsunami sludge 
samples from 32 locations, including schools, 
residential areas, and parks, for heavy met-
als, cyanide, arsenic, and PCBs.
40 The tests 
turned up low levels of lead, PCBs, and arse-
nic at several locations—although Tetsuo 
Ishii, director of the city’s Environmental 
Management Section, said levels were similar 
to those detected in Sendai before the tsu-
nami. The JSMCWM task team also tested 
tsunami sludge from 13 locations in Sendai 
for persistent organic pollutants (POPs), total 
petroleum hydrocarbons, n-hexane extract-
able substances, pH, and water content. All 
results fell below acceptable legal limits, but 
several samples showed high oil and POP con-
tent compared with the other samples. The 
researchers concluded that areas where these 
samples were taken may have been contami-
nated by damaged petrochemical factories and 
recommended waste from the sites be handled 
separately.
41 The group plans to carry out tests 
on samples from across the disaster area and 
to broaden the tests to include heavy metals 
and other hazardous materials. In addition, 
through the end of May the Japan Environ-
mental Measurement and Chemical Analysis 
Association accepted applications from people 
living in the disaster area to receive free soil 
and water quality analysis.
42
Protecting Residents, First 
Responders, and Other Cleanup 
Workers
Life in the disaster area, of course, has not 
stood still. Families are digging through the 
collapsed remains of their homes. Disaster 
victims—many of them aged and weak—
are living in shelters in the midst of debris. 
Swarms of professional and volunteer clean-
up workers and members of Japan’s military, 
the Self Defense Force, are scooping up 
tsunami sludge, clearing streets, and haul-
ing debris to temporary disposal sites seven 
days a week.
Despite the lack of information about the 
contaminants in the dust and tsunami sludge, 
one month after the disaster many volunteers 
and contracted cleanup workers in Ishino-
maki and the coastal city of Minamisanriku-
cho were clearing debris wearing only cotton 
gloves, flimsy paper masks, or no protective 
equipment at all. Access to damaged build-
ings was only partially restricted, even though 
aftershocks continued. It was possible to drive 
and walk freely through damaged industrial 
areas. Only a few factories were cordoned off 
or marked with “danger” signs.
43
By law the professional cleanup workers 
and employees of damaged factories who are 
doing most of the cleanup work in industrial 
areas have a right to better protection. Japanese 
labor law holds employers responsible for pro-
viding proper personal protective equipment 
and educating workers about the risks should 
they fail to use it,
44 and both industry organi-
zations and government agencies have taken 
steps to make sure employers follow through. 
Ayako Toyo, a media officer with the 
Operations Division of the National Fed-
eration of Industrial Waste Management 
Associations, said the 47 prefecture-level 
associations that make up the federation 
have provided safety information to com-
panies working in the disaster area. Sugio 
Furuya, secretary general of the Japan Occu-
pational Health and Safety Resource Center, 
said his organization—a successor to Japan’s 
disbanded national labor union federation—
was carrying out an information campaign 
as well. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare also posted worker safety information 
in shelters and at local labor bureaus,
45 and 
had distributed 90,000 masks in the disas-
ter area by April 11
46; unknown thousands 
more were distributed in later weeks. Officials 
from the Ministry of Labor’s Labor Standards 
Bureau carried out inspections of cleanup 
worksites in selected cities in three prefectures 
on April 27 and 28 to check that workers were 
being properly protected.
47,48
No information has been made public 
about the findings of these inspections, but 
Hisayuki Sato, head of the Health and Safety 
Department at the Iwate Labour Bureau, 
notes that use of protective equipment has 
been uneven across work sites. Yuji Sakata, an 
official in the Ministry of Labor’s Health and 
Safety Planning Section, said the ministry 
planned to continue these inspections peri-
odically. For its part, the Environment Min-
istry issued guidelines soon after the disaster 
hit for handling asbestos and old electrical 
conductors and transformers, which could 
contain PCBs.
19
Health and safety guidelines for American 
response workers participating in cleanup and 
recovery efforts via the U.S. governmental 
or other organizations in Japan are outlined 
by the National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences (NIEHS) Worker Educa-
tion Training Program in an online training 
tool titled “Controlling Hazards During the 
2011 Earthquake and Tsunami Response.”
49 
Designed to walk first responders through the 
range of potential biological, chemical, radia-
tion, and other hazards they may encounter, 
these guidelines direct workers to follow their 
employers’ safety and health rules, including 
requirements for personal protective equip-
ment, which are mandated by the U.S. Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration. 
Comparable training manuals were developed 
by the NIEHS for the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster and other response efforts. 
But in disasters of great geographic scope 
requiring large numbers of response work-
ers, it is challenging to ensure that all workers 
receive adequate health and safety training and 
personal protective equipment, as evidenced by 
experiences following the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
and the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Judging 
by the number of cleanup workers observed in 
Ishinomaki and Minamisanrikucho without 
personal protective gear shortly after the earth-
quake, this was clearly a problem in Japan.
The thousands of volunteers on the front 
lines of the cleanup are in an even more 
vulnerable position than first responders. 
Ikeda, the Osaka environmental lawyer, 
said Japan’s strict worker health and safety 
laws do not protect volunteers because they 
are not employed by anyone. In interviews 
conducted in mid-April, volunteers clean-
ing tsunami sludge from streets and shops 
in Ishinomaki with Peace Boat, one of the 
largest nonprofit organizations working in the 
area, said they received scant safety training 
and were instructed to bring their own per-
sonal protective equipment but were not regu-
larly reminded to use it. Simon Rogers, Peace 
Boat’s safety officer hired specifically for this 
operation, said in late April that the situa-
tion had improved greatly. By then, volunteer 
team leaders were receiving six hours of safety 
training, a safety manual had been created, 
and most volunteers were wearing goggles, 
leather gloves, and masks during their work 
shifts, he said. But those improvements are 
due to the organization’s independent efforts; 
no coordinated regionwide effort exists to 
ensure all disaster volunteers receive uniform 
safety training and proper equipment.
50
Information regarding the health of resi-
dents, workers, and volunteers in the disaster 
area is so far scarce, aside from that related to 
radiation exposure. An official in the Ministry 
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of Health, Labor, and Welfare speaking on 
condition of anonymity said in early June that 
local government offices in the disaster area 
did have health data, especially for people liv-
ing in shelters, but that “the problem for us is 
how to collect that information. Everyone in 
the disaster area is too busy to organize and 
send it in [to the central government].” 
The Health Sciences Division of the 
ministry also intended to start free health 
screenings targeting thousands of people in 
temporary housing, shelters, and damaged 
neighborhoods in parts of Iwate, Miyagi, and 
Fukushima, according to the official. How-
ever, the program has so far been plagued by 
difficulty. “It’s a conservative area, and many 
people don’t trust the central government 
right now. Because of decentralization, local 
governments are usually in charge of these 
kinds of health checks, so if we step in there 
is resistance. We’re planning to do the screen-
ing where we can get cooperation from local 
communities,” the official said. Because of 
the nuclear disaster, health checks are being 
carried out by Fukushima Prefecture for all 
citizens, including internal radiation exposure 
checks for people living near the damaged 
Fukushima Daiichi plant.
51 
Furuya said information regarding the 
health of cleanup workers was extremely lim-
ited as of early June. “We are monitoring the 
asbestos and dust situation on the ground, but 
health surveys of workers have not yet begun, 
either by us or by the Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare,” he said. “While no 
formal reports have come out yet, we’re hear-
ing from doctors on the ground that respira-
tory complaints have increased among both 
workers and residents in the disaster area, 
probably because of the dust.” Nine cases of 
tetanus were also reported in the disaster area 
between March 20 and April 20, all caused 
by injuries sustained during the earthquake or 
tsunami.
52,53
A Global Concern
The earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan 
March 11 rendered meaningless many of 
the standard procedures used to assess, han-
dle, and protect workers and residents from 
chemical hazards. Labels and signs went 
missing. Supervisors weren’t always available 
to consult. City halls and factory offices 
were washed away, and the need to care for 
thousands of homeless survivors swamped 
the public officials who might otherwise 
have focused on longer-term environmental 
health threats. 
But is it inevitable that the health and 
safety challenges now facing Japan would fol-
low a disaster that—to borrow a phrase echoed 
endlessly in the months after the earthquake 
and tsunami—“exceeded all predictions”? Or 
are there measures Japan and other countries 
can take to ensure that even in an event of this 
scale, residents and workers in impacted areas 
are protected from chemical threats?
Since the earthquake struck, Japan has 
come under heavy criticism for its failure to 
prepare for a nuclear disaster like the one at 
the Fukushima Daiichi power plant.
54,55,56,57 
Kyoto University disaster planning expert 
Hirayama said some of the same criticisms 
apply more broadly. “Japan had no concrete 
plan for dealing with chemically contami-
nated disaster waste before the tsunami hit,” 
he said. Ideally such plans would include 
detailed procedures for quickly assessing 
whether debris is hazardous or not. 
Sendai’s Yoshioka added that bureaucratic 
sectionalism posed another man-made obstacle 
during the cleanup: information as well as 
responsibility for environmental monitoring 
and cleanup is divided between various minis-
tries and branches of local governments, which 
increases the likelihood that, in the end, none 
will fulfill their shared responsibility.
The problem is not Japan’s alone. In 
the United States detailed chemical emer-
gency management plans are established by 
the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the Federal 
Emergency Manage  ment Agency (FEMA),
58 
and environ  mental monitoring conducted by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
state environmental agencies, and other fed-
eral and local government entities is often 
part of a federal or state government disaster 
response. But the question of how to address 
health risks posed by chemical contaminants 
released in the course of a disaster can easily 
become controversial. Disputes over where, 
when, and how to conduct chemical haz-
ard assessments have arisen repeatedly in the 
United States—for example, during the Exxon 
Valdez cleanup in 1989, the World Trade 
Center cleanup after 9/11, in the aftermath of 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and during the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster and response. 
Protecting emergency response workers 
from potential chemical and other health 
hazards has also been a subject of intense dis-
cussion in these events. As National Council 
for Occupational Safety and Health executive 
director Tom O’Connor points out, “Wheth-
er occupational safety and health agencies 
should enforce standard safety rules during 
an emergency or whether they should oper-
ate in a ‘non-enforcement mode’ has been a 
hotly debated topic in the U.S.” One exam-
ple involves the shortened hazardous waste 
operations (HAZWOPER) training that was 
instituted for certain emergency workers dur-
ing the Exxon Valdez oil spill response
59 to 
facilitate rapid mobilization of a large oil spill 
cleanup work force. But during the Deepwater 
Horizon response, intense discussion revolved 
around whether the shorter courses provide 
adequate worker training and protection. 
Although certain reporting about the use 
and storage of hazardous chemicals is legally 
required by EPCRA and by local government 
emergency planning programs, the report-
ing requirements themselves resulted from a 
political process and do not include all haz-
ardous materials. Similarly, decisions about 
what information is made public and what 
tests are conducted are often subject to politi-
cal negotiations. Therefore, what is considered 
politically or, indeed, logistically feasible can 
take precedence over what may be ideal in 
terms of health protections.
Assessments of potential chemical health 
hazards resulting from disasters also are 
affected by how much is known about pre-
disaster environmental conditions and local 
levels of pollution. How such conditions are 
taken into consideration inevitably influences 
what is considered “normal” or “safe” for resi-
dents and workers in the affected area.
60
But again, health and safety are not the 
sole considerations in these assessments; con-
fidential business and security considerations, 
practicality, cost, and the desire to return to 
business as usual all come into play. All these 
complications prompt the question of whether 
more emphasis should be placed on the kind 
of upstream chemical pollution prevention 
and hazard elimination that can be achieved 
through green chemistry.
61 A transition to 
more environmentally benign materials and 
manufacturing processes could help protect 
community, environmental, and emergency 
worker health and safety even when natural 
disasters exceed our worst predictions.
In the course of reporting this article, we 
contacted federal agencies, including the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, EPA, 
FEMA, and NIEHS in the United States, and 
a number of corresponding agencies in Japan, 
to ask how emergency management plans for 
chemical hazards have worked in the course 
of actual disasters and how assessment of such 
potential hazards have been evaluated in the 
immediate aftermath of disasters. These agen-
cies directed us to the copious—but general—
information available online that describes 
existing chemical emergency management 
plans and regulations. But many open ques-
tions remain about the implementation and 
adequacy of these policies, particularly in the 
event of a disaster with such wide-ranging 
potential health hazards as the Tohoku earth-
quake and tsunami.
The situation in Japan is evolving, and 
it’s clear that in an event like the March 11 
disaster, primary concerns will always be the 
immediate safety and recovery for everyone 
affected. But even during initial rescue 
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efforts, responders need to be protected 
against chemical hazards, and when cleanup 
and rebuilding efforts begin, the potential 
health hazards posed by chemical contami-
nants become increasingly important. Judg-
ing from the extreme difficulty of obtaining 
concrete, detailed information about potential 
chemical hazards following the Japan disaster, 
this appears to be an aspect of emergency pre-
paredness that, despite well-established formal 
disaster-response plans, remains inadequately 
addressed.
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